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;

MODERNISM AND CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM IN THE THOUGHT OF OTTOKAR PROHASZKA

By Leslie A. Moray

Dr. Leslie A. Muray (Episcopalian) is professor of religious studies at the Lansing
Community College in Lansing, Michigan. He obtained his Ph.D. degree from the
Graduate Theological School in Claremont, California. Several of his previous articles
were published in OPREE.

Little known in the West is the life and work of the Hungarian Ottokar Prohaszka ( 1 858-

1 927), Roman Catholic Bishop of Szekesfehervar and a university professor who was
immensely popular and influential in Hungary at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of
the twentieth centuries. He was the symbol of modernism, for which three of his works were
condemned, and Christian Socialism in his native land. For a time, he even served as a
representative of the Christian Unity Party in Parliament. An eloquent and popular orator
and writer who helped revitalize the Hungarian language, he was capable of anti-Semitic
polemical outbursts.
Instead of doing either a biographical and historical sketch, the biographical elements and
the pertinent historical context will be incorporated into the three sections into which the
paper is divided. The first and second sections treat Prohaszka's modernism and Christian
Socialism in historical context.

His anti-Semitism will not be treated as a part of his

modernism nor of the program of Hungarian Christian Socialism, although characteristic of
it and very much of a feature of the period, but will be dealt with separately in the third
section.

The evaluative comments, particularly Prohaszka's relevance for the newly

established Hungarian democracy and the role of religion in it, are contained in the last
section.

I.
Following the suppression of the Revolution of 1 848-49 and the ensuing reign of terror
and the passive resistance of the Magyars (the Hungarian word for 'Hungarians'), Ferenc
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Deak, A Haza Bolcse ('the country's or homeland's wise one'), designed the Compromise of

1 867, in effect creating a 'dualist' or 'dual' state. The Habsburg Empire became the Austro
Hungarian Empire, with common foreign, defense, and finance ministries, but separate,
autonomous governments and parliaments.

While the franchise was restricted and trade

unions and socialist parties outlawed for some time, a form of parliamentary democracy with
parties, including the Party of Independence which won the election of 1 905 much to
Emperor Franz Joseph's acquiescent chagrin, representing a variety of points of view beyond
the imaginations of North Americans, was in place. In Bismarkian fashion, forms of national
health care, unemployment insurance, and social security were enacted as early as the 1 870s.
It was in this historical context that Hungary underwent a cultural renaissance in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the secular side, the outstanding figure and
symbol of this cultural renaissance was Endre Ady ( 1 877- 1 9 1 9). His poetry was instrumental
in the revitalization of the Hungarian language with its uncanny ability to express the joys,
sorrows, and aspirations of the poor and the oppressed. Western oriented, an admirer of
developments in French philosophy, he was a passionate advocate of social democracy (H
1 82, OTY 1 65- 1 67).
On the religious side, Ottokar Prohaszka was the outstanding figure and symbol of this
intellectual renaissance, contributing to the revitalization of the Hungarian language with his
books, speeches, sermons, meditations, and commentaries, rich with imagery, much of it
reading like poetry. Of Swiss-German background, he illustrates a frequent occurrence in
Hungarian history, a member of another ethnic group becoming a Magyar nationalist and
making a vital contribution to Hungarian culture.
We need to consider two other historical developments to be able to situate Prohaszka's
modernism in context. First, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were periods
of intense nationalism for all of the various ethnic groups that constituted the Austro
Hungarian empire. The negative and tragic features of this outburst of nationalism are all
too obvious and familiar. Nevertheless, part of an 'Hungarian' and 'Christian' 'awakening',
the ambiguities of which we shall explore in the next two sections were intentional attempts
to modernize and to 'raise' the Hungarian people in every way--intellectually, politically,
economically, morally, spiritually; only through such an 'uplift' couldy they play a part in
the drama of modern history. Prohaszka's modernism was a deliberate attempt to stimulate
the growth of his people into modern Roman Catholics (POE).
The second major development, starting in the 1 840s, was the increasing rift, still evident
in the constituencies today's political parties represent, between the 'urbanists' and the
'populists' (RH 74). The terms partly reflect the increasing urbanization of the country;
during Prohaszka's lifetime Budapest became the sixth largest city in Europe (B 67).
However, the terms also refer to some more fundamental differences in orientation: the
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populists were rural oriented nationalists who wanted to preserve the distinctiveness of
Hungarian culture and identity while the urbanists were Western oriented intellectuals.
Although propagated primarily by the populists, elements of both groups have idealized the
pure innocence of the Hungarian peasant (RH 79).
Prohaszka's life and thought reflects both urbanist and populist elements. Nowhere is this
more clear than in his modernism, a deliberate apologetic aimed at secular urban intellectuals
and designed to raise the intellectual sophistication of the faith of the peasants.
Prohaszka studied in Rome ( 1 875 - 1882), earning a doctorate in philosophy and theology.
Initially, he was the inner city chaplain at Esztergom. He became seminary spiritual director
in 1 890 and professor of dogmatic theology at the university in Budapest in 1 904.
Consecrated by Pope Pius X on Christmas Day, 1 905, installed as Bishop of Szekesfehervar
in early 1 906, Archbishop Samassa immediately told him he would be put on the Index. In
1 9 1 1 , three of Prohaszka's works, Modern katolicizmus ( 1907), Az intellektualizmus
tulhajtasai ( 1 9 1 0), and Tobb bekesseget ( 1 9 1 0) were indeed put on the Index. (See the
excellent chronology of Prohaszka's life, including quotes from his diary in MK 15-43.)
The centerpiece of the Hungarian theologian's modernism is his treatment of modern
science, the theory of evolution in particular. In remarkably erudite treatments of geology
and biology, he conveys an inner certainty with integrity about the compatibility of the
Christian faith and the findings of modern science (FE Vol 3 , Vol II 69). In effect, he is
saying "What's the big deal? How can a modern Christian not believe in evolution, in the
findings of science?"
But there is a 'big deal,' a major problem in modern science, namely its mechanistic
view of the universe and positivist premises (FE Vol II 69). In an uncanny anticipation of
ecological insights, Prohaszka claims that common sense as well

as

science itself shows that

the universe is living, dynamic, its parts creative, interdependent, and interrelated (FE Vol
I 3, 6-8).
This living, creative, interrelated universe expresses the divine love; it is the artwork of
the Divine Artist and reflects the image of God (FE Vol I 6-8). Prohaszka's writing is poetic
at this point, resembling the treatment of nature by some of the greatest Hungarian romantic
poets, like Sandor PetOfi, coming close to 'nature mysticism.'
In spite of his anticipation of contemporary ecological sensibilities, he is clearly
anthropocentric (and with our 20/20 ecological hindsight, we need to ask honestly what
modernist was not?). For example, humans are the 'Benjamins' of creation with minds non
human animals do not possess (FE Vol II, 60 66). The evolution of humans was preparation
for God's creation of the human soul (FE Vol II, 73). Although he does not state it explicitly
in those terms, he clearly anticipates the doctrine of the special creation of the human soul.
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It is striking that the Hungarian word for 'supernature', at least in Prohaszka's use of it,
does not have the dualistic connotations it has in English or in the Western philosophical
tradition. Instead, the mysteries of nature point to a Mystery beyond and of which they are
a part.
One may very well ask why three of Prohaszka's works were condemned given that they
seem so relatively tame. In these works, he was more emphatic about the importance of
intuition in contrast to the arid rationalism of scholasticism, although this aspect of his
thought is certainly present in his other works (MK 52). The influence of Bergson is clearly
evident (MK 409, 4 1 9). Officially, Prohaszka's intuitionism, his irrationalism, was the reason
given for the condemnation of his works (MK 52).

Unofficially, there has always been

speculation that his condemnation was the result of his radical political views and activities
(MK 52, 4 1 9).
It has been claimed by Roman Catholic and Marxist commentators alike that Prohaszka
was never the same after being put on the Index, that his works were more guarded and
orthodox (MK 54, 4 1 8-4 1 9).

I disagree with this assessment.

Prohaszka's later writings

reflect a 'Christ' and 'Eucharistic Mysticism', elements of which were present in his earlier
works and which provided him one of the main motivating factors in his first love, pastoral
ministry--celebrating the Mass, hearing confessions, leading retreats. And Bergson provided
him with a philosophical foundation for these concerns ("the elan vital is here in the
Eucharist . . . ." in MK 39).
Prohaszka's apologetics in his books, lectures, sermons, speeches, articles, and meditations
were very effective and influential among Hungarian intellectuals; many converted, others
returned to the Roman Catholic Church in which they had been raised. His modernism was
a call, anticipating Vatican II, to affirm the secular world and participation in it. It is to this
topic we now turn.
II.
In addition to the historical context described in the first section, we need to look at
several other socio-politico developments to which Prohaszka's Christian Socialism was a
response.
First, Deak's Liberal Party was in power for most of the period between 1 867 and the
collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in 1 9 1 8. In most ways typical of nineteenth century
liberals, the Liberal Party, whose constituency was the enlightened nobility and the small but
growing middle class supported constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy, economic
growth, and the free market. Unlike classical liberals in the West, they were among the
architects of the social welfare legislation of the 1 870s.
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Second, in spite of the Liberals' efforts, aspects of the feudal social structure remained
intact. In the late 1 890s/early 1 900s, the economic condition of the peasants, lower nobility,
and relatively small urban working class declined. Life in the working class districts of
Budapest was characterized by chronic housing shortages and overcrowding (B 98) (a preview
of coming attractions in the second half of the twentieth century).
It was to this situation that Prohaszka's Christian Socialism tried to respond. As early as
1 896, he was a nominee of the People's Party, of which the Christian Socialists were one
faction, in the parliamentary elections (he lost) (MK 24).
Since Prohaszka does not define Christian Socialism with any degree of precision, we
need to look at its characteristics.

Hungarian Christian Socialism has been described an

offspring of the Austrian Christian Socialists (HK 272). While there are family resemblances,
such as anti-Semitism and advocacy of social welfare measures, they expressed competing
nationalist aspirations, and, as we shall see, the particular brand of Christian Socialism
advocated by Prohaszka had some distinctively indigenous Magyar features.
The first characteristic of Hungarian style Christian Socialism, according to the former
Bishop of Szekesfehervar, as with all forms of Christian Socialism, and in contrast to other
socialisms, is that it is Christian. For Prohaszka, this means taking the teachings of Jesus
about the rich and poor literally and following them concretely (PNF, Vol I, 1 82, 388).
Following the teachings of Jesus literally in social life will lead to a fully historical realization
of the Reign of God. This has not been atypical of one side of Roman Catholic teaching in
Hungary. Prohaszka in this regard represents what can be, for lack of a better term, called
popular piety or popular religion, which throughout Hungarian history has inspired struggles
for national independence and the extension of freedom, whose representative figures shared
the lives and struggles of their people, in contrast to the traditional unholy alliance between
the hierarchy and existing political power structure and the higher aristocracy, of which
they were a part, owning up to one-third of the arable land in the country as late as 1 945.
A second feature of the Christian Socialism espoused by Prohaszka is democracy. He
comes close to identifying democracy with the historical realization of the Reign of God.
It is the noblest and brightest ideal of the modern epoch, the embodiment of progress (MK
1 72, PNF, Vol. V 1 82). While he does not define the meaning of the word 'democracy', it
is clear in his usage of the term that he means 'rule by the people', real and efficacious
participation in the making of the decisions that affect their lives, self-determination. In
quite a radical way, he wants to extend democracy to the church, eradicating hierarchicalism
and its symbols (MK 1 7 1 - 1 8 1 ).

In a way that anticipates liberation theology or perhaps

articulates an early Magyar theology of liberation, he claims that the authority of clergy can
reside only in their sharing the suffering of the poor and the oppressed. Moreover, it is
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through that sharing that not only clergy but all Christians participate in the death and
resurrection of Jesus Christ (MK 1 7 1 - 1 8 1 ) .
A third and the most distinctive feature o f Prohaszka's Christian Socialism i s his
persistent advocacy of land reform and redistribution. With a nearly mystical love of the
land, he envisioned a paradisiacal Golden Age if each Hungarian peasant, innocent and
uncorrupted, would own his/her land (MK 1 9 1 - 1 9 1 ). In a country where, as we have seen,
the Roman Catholic and Reformed Churches owned up to one-third of the arable land as late
as 1 945, Prohaszka tried to be a role model for land reform and redistribution;, giving 1 ,500
hold of his ecclesiastical estates to the peasants of his diocese (MK 65). During World War
I, he advocated giving returning veterans free land (MK 65). In his advocacy of land reform,
Prohaszka stands in a long historical line stretching at least from Gyorgy D6zsa, who led the
Franciscan inspired Peasants' Rebellion in 1 5 14, to Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister during the
Revolution of 1 956, and Istvan Bib6, an anti-Communist radical socialist who joined Nagy's
cabinet, whose political theories have been most influential on the democratic movement of
the 80s and the nascent democracy of the 90s.
A fourth characteristic of Proh:iszka's Christian Socialism is a virulent anti-capitalism.
In his view, capitalism by its very nature was based on greed and could not be anything but
exploitative. For clergy to preach passive acquiescence to poverty, much of it induced by
· growing capitalism, as the will of God is to show the most profound lack of understanding
of both the gospel and history (PNF Vol I 1 25 , MK 64).
For further insight to Prohaszka's Christian Socialism, we need to probe his life and
political activities. In the early 1 900s, particularly during the time he spent in Budapest, he
and other Christian Socialists frequently debated representatives of the Social Democrats.
Their major philosophical differences were over a mechanistic, deterministic understanding
of dialectical materialism, the class struggle, and the role of violence in the revolutionary
struggle (MK 66). Ady, whose poetry did not reflect mechanism and determinism, just as
he had symbolized the secular side of the intellectual renaissance, represented the best in the
Social Democrats (MK 28, PNF Vol. III, 1 1 6). There was surprising agreement about public
policy measures, including the nationalization of industries (MK 66). Prohaszka shared the
broad consensus concerning basic features of the welfare state, .which he wanted to extend,
that has existed among Magyars since the 1 870s.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Prohaszka, an anti-Habsburg Magyar nationalist, unusual in the
hierarchy, was very much against World War I. His ruminations during this period reflect
his anguish over the tragedy of war. He stated unequivocally that as far as he was concerned,
the provoking of such slaughter for the basest of imperialist motives, defended by immunized
politicians and stupid, lazy diplomats as a necessity, was nothing short of diabolical (MK 32).
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With military defeat imminent, Mihaly Karolyi, an aristocrat and a leader of the
Independence Party, came to power in October, 1 9 1 8.

When the Emperor Charles IV

abdicated, Karolyi embarked on a program of reform that sought to establish Hungary's
independence, a separate peace treaty, universal suffrage with secret ballot, land reform and
redistribution, and recognition of the rights of national minorities. He, like Prohaszka, was
a role model for the land reforms he attempted to enact. When it became evident that the
allies had reneged on their promises regarding Hungary's territorial integrity, compounded
by problems of massive unemployment, inflation, shortages of food, coal, and heating fuel,
Karolyi's government collapsed in March, 1 9 1 8. It was replaced by a short-lived Soviet
Republic (March-August, 1 9 1 9) under the leadership of Bela Kun (H 203-207, OTY 1 771 89). At times romanticized in Marxist literature, Kun's Soviet Republic (the Republic of
Councils) is remembered by most Magyars (except for emigre participants) as a brutal reign
of terror.
In spite of religious persecution, Prohaszka took a very balanced approach. He
editorialized that at the depth of the revolution burns the fire of the Holy Spirit (MK 66).
However, revolutionary social change by itself is inadequate; it needs Christianity if there
is to be hope, understanding, peace, and reconciliation (MK 67). He wrote a pastoral letter
to his clergy and people encouraging them to cooperate with the new government as long as
its actions were not contrary to Christian conscience and beliefs (MK 67, 420). Because of
the latter caveat, government censors did not allow its circulation (MK 67, 420).
After the fall of the Soviet Republic, the "Red Terror" was followed by a period of
"White Terror," some of it propagated by the military, some spontaneously by the peasants
(H 209-235, OTY 1 9 1 -23).

Prohaszka was emphatic that the post-war reconstruction of

Hungary could emanate only from the peasants and the urban proletariat (MK 67). The old
order was gone and he urged those forces that defeated the Bolsheviks to eschew coercion,
brutality, and oppression (MK 67). Just as he had condemned the "Red Terror," he was
uncomprising in his condemnation of the "White Terror" (MK 67).
Admiral Miklos Horthy became regent in 1 920 and quickly became the focal point of
Hungarian yearning for the restoration of national pride, lost territory, and prestige. At
times stereotyped as a fascist in the West, he was in fact a moderating and stabilizing
influence among the turbulent political movements in Hungarian society. Under Horthy,
while the franchise was limited and the Communist party outlawed (with many Communists
imprisoned, some executed, mostly on charges of sabotage), parliamentary democracy was
restored, with a proliferation of political parties representing once again a great range of
points of view. A degree of accommodation was reached with peasants, workers, and even
with the Social Democrats who had united with the Bolsheviks during the period of the
Soviet Republic.

Reform minded parties such as that of the Independent Smallholders
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representing mostly peasants with small parcels of land, the only one of today's political
parties with historic roots in the pre-World War II period, exerted a considerable degree of
influence (H 209-235, OTY 1 9 1 -23 1 ).
During the period of consolidation in the early days of the Horthy government, the new
regent {himself a Hungarian Reformed Protestant) asked Prohaszka, much to the latter's
dismay, to assume the office of Prime Minister. The bishop refused, although he did agree
to become a part of the cabinet (MK 37).· He ran for Parliament on the ticket of the ruling
Christian Unity Party. This time he won (MK 37).
This was an awkward period in Prohaszka's career. He was the first to admit he was not
a politician. He was impatient with the incessant posturing and inflated egos of his fellow
members of Parliament, who, in his view, were trivializing public life (MK 37-39, 686). His
secular, non-Christian Socialist, and Jewish friends were embarrassed by his anti-Semitic
outbursts on the Parliament floor. When Horthy asked Count Istvan Bethlen to become the
Prime Minister, Prohaszka, gratefully, left the cabinet and Parliament in early 1 922 (MK
39). One of the reasons he gave for leaving was the "liberalism" of the Bethlen government
(POE).
Throughout his career, Prohaszka had attacked liberalism. It is very unclear as to what
he meant by 'liberalism' and perplexing as to why he would accuse the Bethlen government
of being 'liberal'. Beth len himself was of aristocratic background, concerned with stability
and constraining the excesses of the left and the right given the events of the immediate
post-World War I period; he was hardly the Magyarized version of radical chic!

In the

context of our discussion of Prohaszka's Christian Socialism in this section, 'l iberalism' was
synonymous with the free market and free trade-which the Bethlen government favored as
it sought increased trade with and loans from the West (sound familiar?).
It may also be helpful to consider the conflict between liberalism and the "integralism"
of the Roman Catholic Church during that era. Even though Prohaszka, whose social thought
was profoundly shaped by Pope Leo XIII's 1 891 encyclical "De Rerum Novarum," was a
radical, if imprecise democrat, he was obedient to the teachings of the Church. Perhaps most
importantly, his ecclesiastical experience did not encompass anything other than integralism.
Thus, while it is not clear that indeed this is the case, I see Prohaszka as ambivalent toward
democracy and integralism, an ambivalence he did not seem to resolve in his own mind.

III.
The most perplexing, ambiguous, and tragic dimension of Prohaszka's life and thought
is his anti-Semitism. We shall look briefly at historical developments that unfortunately
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helped reinforce a long tradition of anti-Judaism from which the other nations of Central
and Eastern Europe are hardly immune.
Following the emancipation of Jews in Hungary in 1 867, the most liberal legislation of
its kind in Central and Eastern Europe, large scale Jewish assimilation took place very
rapidly.

By 1 900, 20% of Hungary's Jewish population lived in Budapest; the same

percentage of the city was Jewish with some streets and districts up to 70%. Since at least
the Revolution of 1 848, Jews had been Magyar nationalists, liberal and democratic. For the
most part they were assimilated; many became a part of the capitol's new 'financial
aristocracy', and numerous others were at the forefront of the intellectual renaissance. The
Emperor Franz Joseph conferred titles and ranks of nobility on a significant number of
emancipated Hungarian Jews.

They played important roles in the Liberal and Social

Democratic Parties and among the urbanists. And eventhough most of the Jewish population
was anti-Communist, Bela K(m and thirty-two of the forty-five Commisars were of Jewish
origin.
A significant shift in the makeup of the Jewish population took place in the late
nineteenth century with an influx of refugees from Poland and Russia. These refugees were
not assimilated; they tended to be poor.

Unlike religious Magyarized Jews, who were

Reform Orthodox; if politically active, they were inclined to be radical.

Assimilated

Hungarian Jews resented them as much as non-Jews.
Even though a considerable degree of respect for the older Jewish population was evident
even during the rule of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian fascists, in the latter part of World
War II, after 1 900 the distinction between the older, assimilated Jews and the newer
immigrants began to disappear. The genuine Hungarian loyalty of even assimilated Jews was
questioned. Assimilated or not, the Jewish population was highly visible. And as we know
all too well, Jews make all too convenient scapegoats during times of economic downturn
and intense nationalism, especially in a part of the world with a long history of anti-Judaism.
A new, entirely modern anti-Semitism that saw assimilation as impossible and even
undesirable was brewing. And adding fuel to the fire, in an era of intense and competing
nationalisms, were the perhaps understandable remarks of a few intellectuals in literary
journals and academic and political debates claiming Jewish superiority (for an excellent
history of Jews in Hungary during this period, see B 87-96, 1 9 1 - 1 96, 204, 84-2 1 8).
It is in this historical context that we need to situate Prohaszka's anti-Semitism. The
bishop seemed to accept the stereotypes about Jewish greed and unique financial abilities.
Some of his anti-capitalist tirades were laced with anti-Semitism.
A recurring theme in Prohaszka's anti-Semitism is resistance to the 'Judaification,' as best
as I can translate his term from the Hungarian, of Hungary (OPE 25). It is difficult to pin
down just what he means by this. Certainly, he did not hate Jews as a race. Neither did he

37

advocate limiting Jewish immigration or restricting the participation of Jews in prominent
positions. He did resent the cosmopolitan attitudes of urbanist Jews. Expressions of Jewish
nationalism served to reinforce his acceptance of stereotypes and the anti-Judaism of the
inherited tradition.
Prohaszka did not share the view of the new, modern anti-Semitism that claimed that
Jews could not and, more importantly, should not be assimilated into Hungarian society.
On the contrary, he was adamant in his advocacy of Jewish assimilation. He sounds quite
patronizing in this attitude, in effect saying that Jews were 'good' as long as they 'behaved'
by assimilating. Ironically, his position was not substantially different from that of most of
the older, assimilated, Magyarized generation of Jews.
During the reign of Communism, Prohaszka was described as a fascist. He was not;
Hungarian fascism had not yet come on the scene during his lifetime, and his thought bears
no family resemblance to other fascist ideas. Some of Prohaszka's younger and no less anti
Semitic colleagues in the Christian Socialist movement, such as Sandor Giesswein, renounced
their anti-Semitism during the period of fascist ascendancy, and, at not inconsiderable risk
to their personal safety, were heroic defenders and protectors of Hungarian Jews (B 205).
In no way have I wanted to defend and justify anti-Semitism; it is indefensible. More
than anything, I have tried to show that Prohaszka's anti-Semitism is an expression of a tragic
dimension of the history of his people to which, because of his stature, he added an aura of
credibility and legitimacy. It is my hope that our look at the historical context has been
somewhat illuminating to the task, not only for Hungarians, but for the Christian tradition
itself, of coming to grips with its long tradition of anti-Judaism that has been the breeding
ground of anti-Semitism and its fateful consequences.

IV.
Some evaluative comments, particularly Prohaszka's relevance for the newly established
Hungarian democracy and the role of religion in it, are in order.
The most pertinent aspect of Prohaszka's life and thought, in my view, is his modernism.
To make my case for this claim, I shall explore the relevant historical context, as I have
done throughout this paper.
After the Communist Party came to power in the late 1 940s, a period of severe repression
followed. Church properties were confiscated, religious orders disbanded, clergy imprisoned,
tortured, and even executed. While the Reformed Church for the most part reached a modus
vivendi with the government, the very symbols of defiance, J6zsef Cardinal Mindszenty,
Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary, the traditionally powerful see of the
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Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, and Lajos Ordass, the Lutheran Bishop (who spent
twenty years under house arrest), were tried and imprisoned.

In the aftermath of the

Revolution of 1 956, it was not until after Mindszenty left the sanctuary of the American
embassy in 1 9 7 1 that all of the Hungarian churches reached a modus vivendi with the existing
regime. Still experiencing repression, the major preoccupation of the churches was with
institutional maintenance-survival. Theology became exclusively confessional. The focus
of practical interest was on how Christians can function appropriately as citizens of a socialist
society.
Although some have claimed that the close relationship between the religious hierarchy
and the state machinery helped pave the way for the recently established democracy (SN 6872), there can be little doubt that church leaders lagged far behind the pace of reform. Most
Magyars tend to see them as continuing the long history of the uncanny ability of
ecclesiastical hierarchies to accommodate any regime. It is no state secret that even as both
church and secular political leaders have been pleading for forgiveness and reconciliation,
it is the church that has been conducting purges. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence-
growing church attendance, an increased number of ordinations--of a religious resurgence.
This is in no small measure due to the novel forms the popular piety that has stirred the
yearning for freedom so often in the past have taken in the 1 960s and 1 970s, such as 'the
base communities', condemned by both state and church, organized by Father Buhinyi around
the issue of conscientious objection (FBPCH 9-28).
This reputation for accommodationism, combined with a near oblivion to the
inseparability of intellectual currents and political developments, is preventing the churches
in Hungary from being a more effective, positive, socially transformative influence at a time
of hope, anticipation--and anxiety. For example, although the most secular of intellectuals
appreciate and want to preserve the vital role of Christianity in Hungarian culture, to them
the almost exclusively confessional theological stance of the churches seems obscure and far
removed from the adventure of creating and forming a democracy.
Given this analysis of the current situation, the potential of the Hungarian churches to
have an effective, transformative impact would be enhanced greatly by developing a 'public
theology' or, more accurately, a variety of 'public theologies' .

What I mean by 'public

theology' is twofold: ( I ) theologies that deal effectively with public affairs, and (2) theologies
whose criteria for adjudicating truth claims are not limited to the 'special' criteria that apply
only within communities of faith but are open to the 'public' criteria of human experience
and reason. In no way do I want to claim that confessional theologies are irrelevant public
affairs; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the signers of the Barmen Declaration, the Sojourner
community in the United States, Christian anti-apartheid activists in South Africa, the base
communities of Latin America and Asia, and Father Bulanyi himself provide eloquent
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testimony to the contrary. However, given the inseparable connection between intellectual
currents and political developments, democratic reforms, in contemporary Hungary, the
development of a public theology or theologies would greatly enhance the churches'
responsiveness to present needs and enrich the public discussion of issues of importance.
Proh:iszka's modernism is an indigenous Hungarian form of such a public theology.
Additionally, aimed at both urbanists and populists, it has the potential for being a healing
force in this traditional rift.

An exact replication of that modernism is impossible and

unhelpful. However, a critical reappropriation of his modernist style of theologizing can
provide an opening to a contemporary, indigenous public theology that can revitalize the state
of theological reflection and connect it to the dramatic historical changes that have been
occurring during the course of the last few years.
The legacy of Proh:iszka's Christian Socialism is more ambiguous. First of all, if we
consider what I view as his ambivalence toward democracy and integralism, there can be
little doubt that the Hungarian churches need to affirm democracy unequivocally (in spite
of pockets of nostalgia for integralism).

Whether democracy can be extended to the

traditionally hierarchical churches remains to be seen. It must be admitted, however, that
the egalitarian base communities of the 60s and 70s came close to reflecting Proh:iszka's
vision of clergy sharing the lives, the joys, sorrows, and sufferings of their people.
Second, while the word 'Christian' applied to a political party may be problematic to
most North Americans (pace Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson et al.), we need to remember the
degree to which a literal understanding of Jesus' teachings, like Proh:iszka's, concerning love,
the rich and the poor, has penetrated the collective psyche of Hungarian popular piety.
Even if no� necessarily expressing itself in the form of a political party, this outlook is such
a prevalent part of Magyar Roman Catholic social conscience that it will be on the Hungarian
scene in the foreseeable future.
Prohaszka's uncompromising advocacy of land reform, while reflecting his populism at
its best, is such a symbol of the historic aspirations of the Hungarian people, the free,
landowning, self-determining peasant, uncorrupted because of her/his rootedness in the
earth, that it is capable of including the hopes of all Hungarians.

Indeed, the nearly

universal appeal of this symbol to the Magyar psyche profoundly shaped his endeavors to
reach out to the urban proletari�t.
In concluding the comments on Proh:iszka's Christian Socialism, one should note that
while in one sense it is true, as some have claimed, that the left is dead in Hungary (RH 8485); in another sense this claim needs to be profoundly qualified. Even as Hungary enters
the global economy, as the mechanisms of the market are adopted and foreign investment
encouraged, measures supported in varying degrees by the vast majority of Hungarians, it
is important to realize that the historical, broad national consensus supporting the basic
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features of the social welfare state is intact (the Alliance of Free Democrats, which received
34% of the vote in the election of 1 990, may be somewhat of an exception, although 'the
safety net' they envision is closer to that of the Scandinavian countries than those of the
United States and Great Britain). A consideration of Prohaszka's Christian Socialism serves
to remind all of us of this basic characteristic of Hungarian political and economic life.
Prohaszka's anti-Semitism reflects one of the most tragic ambiguities of Hungarian
history. Hungarians need to come to grips with and admit honestly this ambiguity, to confess
it, repent ('turn around'), and seek liberation from it, a history of anti-Semitism nurtured
by an even longer history of anti-Judaism in Christianity. No less do they need to retrieve
and celebrate a more liberal and empowering part of the past, such as the Revolution of
1 848, when the greatest of national heroes, Petofi, in spite of pogroms, maintained that
national independence and democracy could not be achieved until all Jews, assimilated or
not, were emancipated, the post- 1 867 period, when Jews were welcome, their contributions
celebrated, and appreciate the traditional pride of Hungarian Jews in their national origins.
In spite of some ever ominous public signs of anti-Semitism and comments of a similar
nature by some politicians, it is to the credit of the current ruling coalition and all
contemporary political parties that they have condemned anti-Semitism, called for an honest
appraisal of the past, and celebrate publicly the indispensable contributions of its Jewish
citizens to Hungarian culture.
Finally, an all too brief but hopefully thought provoking note about the relevance of
Prohaszka for North Americans, to whom his historical context, life and thought must seem
to terribly remote: Holderlin once said, we cannot understand our home until we have
ventured from it.
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